The administration of justice for speeding offences in the UK is a massively controversial subject. All those that receive the penalties somehow feel they are being duped, that something is essentially wrong, an imbalance they just can’t put their finger on, and it isn’t a case of bitter resentment from being caught, there are nagging doubts lurking in a mist of suspicion that something isn’t quite right.
This book analyses the law regarding the administration of justice for speeding infractions, identifies a surprising number of anomalies, assesses the origin and creation of the inequalities produced and evaluates the effectiveness of the legal authorities, providing a thorough interpretation and alternative recourse for the administration process. The anomalies extracted for investigation in this book are incredible, but the quantity of anomalies poses a worrying consideration of a designed ambition. There are not just a small handful of peculiarities, there are a swarm.
The police tend to send a Notice of Intended Prosecution and a request for driver identity information before issuing a penalty notice. This is wrong. The penalty notice should be sent at the same time giving the recipient the option to dispense with the offence through acceptance of liability.
An obstacle is produced by the demand for a signature of liability, a demand which does not discriminate between those that are actually guilty of speeding infractions and those that are innocent, or where an inadequate quality of photographic evidence exists. Not having to provide or sign a confession is a democratic right. A signature on a form is not a form of registered and checkable information. The right not to be forced to sign a confession protects people against fraud, corruption and miscarriage of justice. There would be no need to investigate crimes if the police could demand confessions.
The suppression of photographic evidence interferes with the apparent intention of parliament to provide a statutory right for those accused to receive ‘reasonable information’ of the alleged offence, and that information should not just be a hypothetical assumption, but should be of ‘assessable content’.
The documentation received by those accused of speeding infractions is full of rhetorical devices.
It would be a fallacy in itself to suggest that all people accused of speeding infractions are guilty, so there should in theory be a genuine process of filtration.
For those attempting to query or complain about anomalies in the administration process, or in the validity of the accusation made, people generally find that their correspondence goes unanswered.
There are so many anomalies involved in the administration of speeding penalties that it is difficult to suggest that they are accidental, but may have been loaded for action. Whether people agree or not, where there’s an opportunity for individual decision making, prejudice lurks beneath the depths of reason. The contents of this book attempt to address the issues through analysis and by creating awareness of the anomalies for the legal services.
Uk Speeding Fines Are You Really Guilty? by Garry Sherwin available in Amazon Books.